In this paper, we concentrate on the security issues of the integrity protection of LTE. EIA1 and EIA3, two integrity protection algorithms of LTE, are insecure if the initial value (IV) can be repeated twice during the life cycle of an integrity key (IK). Especially for EIA1, because of its linearity, given two valid Message Authentication Codes (MACs) our algorithm can forge up to 2 32 valid MACs. Thus, the probability of finding a valid MAC is dramatically increased. Although the combination of IV and IK never repeats in the ordinary case, in our well-designed scenario, the attacker can make the same combination occur twice. The duplication provides the opportunity to conduct our linear forgery attack, which may harm the security of communication. To test our linear forgery attack algorithm, we generated two counter check messages and successfully forged the third one. We also examined the attack timing by simulating real communication. From the experimental results, our attack is applicable.
INTRODUCTION
After more than twenty years evolution, cellular system has evolved to the fourth generation. Security issues of the cellular system are attracting more and more attention, because the expenses of attacking the system are much cheaper than before.
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Integrity protection can protect messages from being modified. It also can prevent the impersonation attacks. Thus, integrity protection is important in communication, especially in wireless channels. Compared with wired transmission, active eavesdropping in a wireless environment is relatively easy. Without integrity protection, attackers can modify messages transmitted over the air as they wish.
In the public key cryptography domain, integrity is protected by digital signatures; similarly, in symmetric key cryptography, it is protected by MACs. Because computation of digital signatures is inefficient, in some resource-constrained applications, integrity protection is always based on MACs.
A MAC-generating algorithm usually has two components: the underlying cipher and the upper-level structure. An underlying cipher could be the keyed hash function, block cipher or stream cipher. The input messages of the algorithm are allowed to have arbitrary length. Input messages pass through the underlying cipher and become cipher text. This cipher text is assembled by the upper-level structure to get a length-fixed string, which is the output of the MAC. There are many widely used MACs, such as HMAC [7] , EMAC [11] , XCBC [9] , OMAC [17] , TMAC [12] and XOR MAC [8] .
One threat to integrity protection is forgery attacks. If an attacker wants to impersonate some identities or to modify some messages, he must have the ability to forge the MAC (or the signature in public key cryptography) of some specific data. In this paper, since the cellular communications are protected by MACs, we focus on a forgery attack on MAC. There are basically two ways to forge a MAC: breaking the underlying cipher or bypassing the underlying cipher. The former one is hard to achieve, since the underlying ciphers are usually chosen to be classical ciphers, which have already been proven to be secure in both theory and practice. Thus, attackers always choose the latter one, when they try to forge a MAC. We also chose the latter way, which means our goal is to bypass the underlying ciphers of the cellular system to forge a MAC.
To bypass the underlying cipher, the attacker can apply either a probabilistic method or a structure dependent method. The probabilistic method, for example, the birthday attack, can be launched at most MAC generating algorithms. Although its target is general, the result of a birthday attack is not very significant, because the searching complexity is still exponential. The attack is also not realistic, because in practice, the attacker is not allowed to make that many queries. In contrast, some structure-dependent
MAC Based On Stream Ciphers and EIA
Wireless communication is widely used in daily life. As a result, stream ciphers are becoming more important than ever before. Originally, most MACs were based on keyed hash functions and block ciphers. Now some researchers have turned to the design of MACs based on stream ciphers.
In the past, the research on stream ciphers based MACs has not received much attention as that of block ciphers or hash functions based MACs. Recently, researchers have realized the importance of MACs using stream ciphers. Some significant work has been presented, such as GMAC [14] , Grain-128a [6] , EIA1, and EIA3. The underlying cipher of GMAC is a block cipher in counter mode, which makes a block cipher act as a stream cipher. Thus, GMAC can work with other stream ciphers directly. Both EIA1 and EIA3 have adopted some ideas from GMAC with some modifications to form their own MAC-generating algorithms.
It is publicly acknowledged that EIA2 can be considered as a secure MAC-generating algorithm, because it utilizes AES as the underlying cipher and CMAC as the MAC structure. AES is widely used for commercial purposes, and gets many analyses from academic study. AES has proven to be secure so far both theoretically and practically. CMAC is a kind of CBC MAC. Such kinds of MACs have already received many analyses, and proven to be secure.
Unlike EIA2, grounds for trusting EIA1 and EIA3 are not so solid. Since they are not as popular as AES and CBC MAC, the security of these algorithms is still not well studied. To the authors' best knowledge, there has been no significant attack on EIA1 so far, which means it does not evolve after it is created. EIA3 receives more attacks. But only some of them are significant.
Related Work
There is already some work analyzing the EIA family. The following attacks are two of the most significant.
Cycling Attack [16] can be applied to all polynomial MACs. Since EIA1 is a kind of polynomial MAC, it also suffers such attacks.
ZUC and EIA3 were published later than Snow 3G and EIA1. However, EIA3 has received more analyses than EIA1. The attack [18] proposed by Thomas et al. makes EIA3 change from v1.3 to v1.5. After changing to v1.5, EIA3 does not suffer such attacks any more. However, it is still not immune to our new attack, which will be presented in Section 3. valid MAC-message pairs, the probability of finding a pair with valid MAC and valid message is quite high. Statistically, there is more than one meaningful pair among those 2 32 pairs. For brute-force attacks, the probability of finding the valid MAC of a message is 1 2 32 . Now the probability that we get a meaningful MAC-message pair is increased to more than 1 2 32 . In fact, finding the λ that can generate a meaningful pair is much easier in practice than finding it in theory, because the messages usually have some specific structures. Those structures may shrink the searching space. In addition, such an attack does not aim at only EIA1 and EIA3 but also at some general polynomial MACs.
Our Contributions
To prove that our linear forgery attack is doable, we create a scenario from which our attack can be launched. Such a scenario is based on the observation that the authentication of LTE and UMTS is not really mutual, although it is claimed to be a mutual authentication. In Extensible Authentication Protocol -Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA), only the server sends the challenge to a client. Checking the response of the challenge, the server can authenticate clients. Nevertheless, a client does not challenge the server. Thus, it can only authenticate a server by checking the MAC of the authentication vector. Such a protocol leaves a hole for the replay attack. Ordinarily speaking, the replay attack cannot get anything. However, because of our attack, the replay attack makes the forgery possible.
The rest part of this paper is organized as followings. In Section 2 we introduce MACs and the EIA family. In Section 3, we present some security issues of EIA1 and EIA3, and propose a forgery attack on EIA1 and EIA3. Since the attack makes use of the linearity of MACs, we call it, a linear forgery attack. Section 4 describes a scenario from which the linear forgery attack can be launched in practice, and shows some experimental results of our attack.
PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce the definition of the linear operation. This concept is the vital part of our attack. Generally, most polynomial MACs, such as EIA1 and EIA3, have this linear property. Table 1 lists all notations used in this paper. For the purpose of this paper, the Linear Operation is defined as Definition 1. F (x) represents the operation F applied to x. If the operation F satisfies
Notation, Definition and Data Representation
where a, b and c are from a Galois Field; a, b and c · a ∈ Domain of F , then F is called linear operation.
In the following part of this paper, all data variables are presented with the most significant bit on the left-hand side. For example, V is a 64-bit integer, < V >= (V0V1 · · · V62V63)2, where Vi is the i-th bit of V . V0 is the most significant bit.
We use the term "package" and "message" to represent the protocol data unit and the information that carried by the package respectively. Package is composed of the header (used for control) and the message. Take the counter check message for example, it is a package of radio resource control (RRC) protocol. The control message sequence number (SQN) is the header, and the values of different counters are the messages. These two parts together are called a package of the counter check message.
CBC-MAC, XOR MAC and GMAC
In wireless communication network, MAC is one of the most important elements to secure the system. CBC-MAC and XOR MAC are two well-known MACs. CBC-MAC comes from the CBC mode of block ciphers. There are a lot of variations of CBC-MAC, such as EMAC [11] , XCBC [9] , OMAC [17] and TMAC [12] . XOR MAC [8] has two categories, XMACC and XMACR. Compared with CBC-MAC, the structure of XOR-MAC is relatively simple.
GMAC has different design compared with CBC-MAC and XOR MAC, because it is based on the counter mode of the block cipher. GMAC [14] is standardized by NIST in 2007. When it is used for encrypted authentication, it is called GCM. GCM outputs both the encrypted data and MAC. When it is only used to generate MAC without encryption, it is called GMAC. Unlike GCM, GMAC does not output the encrypted data. GMAC is composed of two parts, GCTR and GHASH. GCTR is the counter mode of a block cipher. GHASH is a polynomial hash function. Messages first are encrypted by GCTR, and then passed through GHASH.
EIA1, EIA2 and EIA3
Because both the underlying cipher and the upper-level structure of EIA2 are proven to be secure, we do not discuss it in this paper. Hence, in this section, we present more details of EIA1 and EIA3 than of EIA2.
EIA1
EIA1 is adopted from UIA2. The underlying cipher is Snow 3G. In the evaluation of EIA1, it is said that EIA1 comes from GMAC. In fact, it only borrows the idea of GHASH. Thus, EIA1 is considered to be a polynomial MAC. Details of EIA1 are shown in Figure 1 . At the beginning stage of EIA1, Snow 3G generates a 160-bit key stream. Then this key stream is truncated into P , Q and OT P . P and Q are 64-bit words. OT P is a 32-bit word. In Figure 1 , Mi is the i-th block of message. The length of each block is 64 bits.
The mathematical description of EIA1 is given by
+OT P.
(1) Equation 1 can be written as
Part 1 is a linear operation of the message. Part 2 is a value only relevant to the length of the message. If the length is fixed, part 2 is a constant. So MAC is computed by a linear combination of one linear block operation and a constant.
EIA2
Kasumi is replaced by AES in the new standard. Accordingly, EIA2 is put into the standard to replace UIA1. The underlying cipher of EIA2 is AES. As a block cipher, AES can use some existing MAC generating algorithms without any changes. CMAC [13] is chosen as the MAC generating algorithm of EIA2. CMAC is a kind of CBC-MAC, which has already been well studied.
EIA3
Originally, ZUC is not in UMTS. It is added to the standard after the system migrates to LTE. The integrity protection based on ZUC is EIA3. The same as EIA1, EIA3 is also claimed to be GMAC. However, Figure 2 suggests that it is much closer to XOR MAC. In 
is the i-th bit of message; zi is the i-th word in the key stream, i.
The main observation of EIA3 is that Part 1 is a linear operation. This is very straightforward:
Part 2 is a constant if the length is fixed.
IV Synchronization Mechanism
EIA1, EIA2 and EIA3 synchronize IVs in the same way. As required by the EIA family, COU N T − I and F RESH are input as parameters to form IV of the underlying cipher. F RESH is a random number. COU N T − I is a counter that records how many times IK has already been used so far. It contains two parts, SQN and hyper frame number (HFN). SQN is the sequence number. It is increased after a package is sent. When SQN overflows, HFN is increased. COU N T − I and F RESH together are used to prevent replay attacks.
F RESH and COU N T − I are written in the package to synchronize the transmitter and receiver, which maintain two counters, named COU N T ERtx and COU N T ERrx, respectively. The transmitter uses COU N T ERtx as the value of its COU N T − I, and then generates key streams. When the receiver receives a package, the value of COU N T − I is compared with the value of COU N T ERrx. If the value of COU N T − I is greater than COU N T ERrx, F RESH is used to form IV together with COU N T − I. Then the key streams generated by this IV and IK are used to verify the MAC. If the value of COU N T − I is smaller than COU N T ERrx, this package will be disregarded.
SECURITY ISSUE OF EIA1 AND EIA3
We present our work in this section. Compared with other works before, our attack is more practical. We need only two valid MACs to forge another valid MAC. 64 ). The minimal polynomial of α over GF (2 32 ) is given by
Quasi-Linearity Property of EIA1 and EIA3
where u = β 17 , v = β. Then each element in GF (2 64 ) can be represented as a + bα, a, b ∈ GF (2 32 ). We define
Mn−iP i , f or P ∈ GF (2 64 ), Mi ∈ GF (2 64 ).
Proof. According to the definition of f (M, P ), we have
Mn−iP i = λf (M, P ).
Thus, the assertions are true.
We have the MAC of M generated by EIA1 as
OU T P U T Property 2. For any λ ∈ GF (2 32 ),
EIA3 has very similar properties, which can allow attackers to forge one MAC with the probability 1/2. More seriously, under the chosen plaintext attack, attackers can even recover somes part of the key stream. The details of this attack are presented in the full version of this paper.
Linear Forgery Attack Algorithm
Assume that we can make three queries to obtain MACs of the messages Mi, for i = 1, 2, 3, under the same IV. Let Q · f (Mi, P ) = ai + biα, ai, bi ∈ GF (2 32 ).
Theorem 1. Let (i, j, k) be a permutation of (1, 2, 3). For any λ ∈ GF (2 32 )
which is a valid MAC value of the message
Proof. We give a proof only for (i, j, k) = (1, 2, 3), since the proofs for the other cases are similar. In order to prove (7), we compute the results of both sides of (7). According to Properties 1 and 2
On the other hand,
λ(M AC(M1) + M AC(M2))) + M AC(M3)
= λ(a1 + c + OT P + a2 + c + OT P ) + a3 + c + OT P = λ(a1 + a2) + a3 + c + OT P.
The assertion follows from (8) and (9) .
From (7), we have the following corollary. Corollary 1. Let (i, j) be a permutation of (1, 2), and k ∈ (1, 2). For any λ ∈ GF (2 32 ), (7) is true. In other words, if we have the valid MACs from two queries, then
are valid.
From Corollary 1, we need only two valid MACs to forge a new one. In practice, we can reduce the number of queries by applying Corollary 1. Obtaining two valid MACs generated by the same IV is much easier than obtaining three.
The algorithm to forge a valid MAC by using two known valid MACs is shown in Algorithm 1, where f indλ() is a function that returns a λ such that either λ(M1 +M2)+M1 or λ(M1 + M2) + M2 is a valid message. How to find λ, such that the message is also valid, is discussed in Section 3.3. Remark 1. EIA's MAC has 32 bits. An attacker wishes to forge a valid MAC, it is equivalent to him randomly selecting 32 bits; the probability of success is 1 2 32 . However, if the attacker can make two queries for obtaining two valid MACs, then he can forge 2 32 messages with valid MACs. In Section 4, we will demonstrate how the attacker can obtain two valid MACs in practice.
How To Find λ
We randomly pick a λ, then we can get a MAC of a message. However, this message may not be a valid message for a protocol. Thus, the problem is how to find a λ that can generate the MAC of a valid message.
Usually in a real environment, it is easier to find λ, because there is a relationship between these two known messages, such as the relationship between two counter check messages. Two counter check messages have very similar structures. Therefore, most bits in the exclusive or of two counter check messages are zeros. We need to consider only very few bits, which are nonzero.
Moreover, even if we cannot find the valid message, our linear forgery attack can still cause some Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Because the MAC is valid, every time the receiver must do the decoding and then finds the message is not well formatted, the computational resource will be occupied by verifying and decoding.
APPLICATION
In this section, we design a scenario in which the same IV and IK will occur twice. Following this, our linear forgery attack can be launched to get the valid MAC. Figure 3 demonstrates the procedure by which we can get the same SQN together with the same IK. The preconditions are: (1) we can set up the man-in-the-middle (MITM), and (2) there is a malware on the phone that can shut down and turn on the radio. Perez et al. [15] show that Condition (1) is applicable. Condition (2) is also easy to satisfy. We can choose the Android smart phone to be our target because Android is an open platform, which is popular around the world.
A Scenario of Fixing IV
First, the MITM attacker records all user data messages and control messages, including the authentication and key agreement messages. When this attacker observes the package he wants to forge, he shuts down the radio of the victim and then turns it on. The MITM attacker uses the recorded AKA messages to conduct a replay attack. In the AKA protocol, mobile devices are not required to verify whether the random number has been received before or not. They only check the freshness of SQN. However, in some cases, we can make SQN wrap around (the details are shown in full version). Thus, the victim believes it is talking with the real base station. Notice that the EAP-AKA is claimed to be mutually authenticated. The user equipment (UE) proves its identity to an radio network controller (RNC) by replying to the challenge from the RNC. However, since the UE does not send the challenge to the RNC, the RNC can prove itself only by computing the MAC of the authentication vector. The random number in the authentication vector can make sure each authentication vector is unique. However, the UE cannot record all random numbers it received before. This enables the replay attack. Such attack makes the UE accept the fake RNC. Generally, the attacker can get nothing from the replay attack, because he still cannot get the key. But in our case, we do not care about the key. The only thing we care about is the SQN. As long as we get two identical SQNs with the same IK, we can launch our linear forgery attack.
After the victim accepts the random number, it generates the same IK, which is also used in the session suspended by the attacker. When the victim believes the attacker is the real base station, it begins to send packages. The attacker replies with the previously recorded packages. The victim may accept or reject those packages, but it does not matter, because the only target for the attacker is to increase the victim's counter until the SQN reaches the recorded value.
As long as we get the sequence number that we want, the MITM attacker applies our linear forgery attack to forge a valid MAC of the package. This forged package together with the forged MAC will be forwarded to the real base station. Since the MAC will pass the verification, this package will be accepted.
Counter Check Message
A realistic application of our linear forgery attack is that we can forge the counter check message. In LTE, the integrity of the user plane is not protected. Thus, the counter check message is sent from the RNC to the UE to check the number of data packages that have been transmitted. The RNC includes the most significant s bits of its counter in the counter check message. When the UE receives the counter check message, it compares its own counter with the value included in the counter check message and sends its counter's value back. If the difference is not acceptable, the RNC will release the connection. This procedure is shown in Figure  4 . Chen et al. [10] present more details about the counter check message.
We want to forge the counter check message because sometimes the attacker inserts some data into user plane data. If the counter check message is conducted correctly, the RNC will find out the insertion. For example, the MITM attacker inserts a redirect URL command or advertisement into the web page that the user is browsing. He must expect that RNC cannot detect the insertion. Then he needs to modify the counter check message.
Launching Attack
We assume that the MAC-I in Figure 4 is generated by EIA1 or EIA3. IVs of EIA1 and EIA3 are composed of two portions. The least significant four bits represent the Radio Resource Controller sequence number (RRC SQN). The other twenty-eight bits represent the HFN. Each time an RRC signal is sent, the RRC SQN is increased by one. If there is an overflow of the RRC SQN, the HFN is increased by one.
Attacking scenario:
1. RNC sends a counter check message to the MITM attacker.
2. The MITM attacker forwards this message to the UE, and gets the reply form the UE with M AC1.
3. The MITM attacker applies the attack we mentioned above, and gets M AC2.
The MITM attacker forges λ(M AC1+M AC2)+M AC1
or M AC2 + λ(M AC1 + M AC2), then forwards to the real base station.
5. The RNC finds the difference is acceptable, and continues to communicate with the MITM attacker.
6. The MITM attacker can continue to forward messages between the RNC and the UE without being detected by the RNC.
This process creates a forged MAC. In this procedure, there is a drawback, i.e., the connection between the MITM attacker and the RNC may time out during the forgery process. So such attack can forge only the counter check message that is sent not too long after powering up.
Experimental Results
In order to test our attack, we generate two counter check messages, in which there are two counters, as shown in Table  2 . The RRC commands of these two packages are listed in Table 3 . 
M1
0x30 0x27 0xA1 0x25 0xA4 0x23 0xA0 0x21 0xA0 0x1F 0x80 0x01 0x1E 0xA1 0x1A 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x0A 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x02 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x01 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x32 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x04 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x03 M2 0x30 0x27 0xA1 0x25 0xA4 0x23 0xA0 0x21 0xA0 0x1F 0x80 0x01 0x1E 0xA1 0x1A 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x0A 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x03 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x02 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x32 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x05 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x04
Forge Procedure
The xor sum of these two messages is 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x07
Then chose λ =0x1B, λ(M1 + M2) is 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x1B 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x2D 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x1B 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x41
Finally, we get the message Mnew = M2 + λ(M1 + M2) 0x30 0x27 0xA1 0x25 0xA4 0x23 0xA0 0x21 0xA0 0x1F 0x80 0x01 0x1e 0xa1 0x1A 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x0A 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x18 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x2F 0x30 0x0B 0x80 0x01 0x32 0x81 0x02 0x01 0x1E 0x82 0x02 0x01 0x45
This message is represented in a binary form. Decoding the binary message, we get the result shown in Figure 6 , which demonstrates the xml form of the binary message. From Figure 6 , it is obvious that the forged message still contains the counter values of the bearers 10 and 50. The uplink and downlink counter values of the bearer 10 are 577 and 531 respectively. They are increased compared with the real values. The counter values of the bearer 50 are increased as well. The forged value of uplink counter is 274, and the forged downlink counter value is 352. We can also 
Therefore we successfully forge a valid package, in which the value of each counter is increased, and the MAC of the message is valid. This means if the attacker inserts some packages, RNC will not realize that.
<DL-DCCH-Message> <message> <counterCheck> <r3> <counterCheck-r3> <rrc-TransactionIdentifier>30</rrc-TransactionIdentifier> <rb-COUNT-C-MSB-InformationList> <RB-COUNT-C-MSB-Information> <rb-Identity>10</rb-Identity> <count-C-MSB-UL>577</count-C-MSB-UL> <count-C-MSB-DL>531</count-C-MSB-DL> </RB-COUNT-C-MSB-Information> <RB-COUNT-C-MSB-Information> <rb-Identity>50</rb-Identity> <count-C-MSB-UL>274</count-C-MSB-UL> <count-C-MSB-DL>352</count-C-MSB-DL> </RB-COUNT-C-MSB-Information> </rb-COUNT-C-MSB-InformationList> </counterCheck-r3> </r3> </counterCheck> </message> </DL-DCCH-Message> 
Timing of Attack
Turning the radio off and on usually costs three to six seconds. If RNC does not time out within this range, our attack can be launched. There is no requirement for this time-out duration in the standard. It is decided by the manufacturer. We cannot make a direct test, because analysis of public communications is forbidden by the law. However, since RRC commands are sent in an ARQ fashion, we can use the retransmitting time to show the time out duration intuitively. We simulate an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel. The modulation scheme is Quaternary Phase Shift Keying (QPSK). The result is shown in Figure  5 . Each column is corresponding to a set of coding parameters. The top row shows the bit Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), while the bottom row represents the symbol SNR. Figure 5 indicates that when the bit SNR or symbol SNR is around −0.2dB, the base station needs to transmit a message three times on average to ensure that the user can receive that message. If users are in a building, such a situation may occur with high probability. To make sure all users can get services, the time out duration must be relatively long. This may give us a chance to conduct the attack.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a method whereby two known valid MAC-message pairs generated by the same IV and IK, we can forge 2 32 valid MAC-message pairs. In a real environment, we can easily find a meaningful MAC-message pair among those 2 32 pairs. We also developed an attack that makes the same IV and IK occur twice. This enables our linear forgery attack in practice.
To prevent our linear forgery attack, the structures of EIA1 and EIA3 need to be changed such that either the message is involved in generating the key stream or the MAC is generated in a nonlinear fashion. The problem is how to find a way that can avoid linear structures without compromising efficiency. So far, this issue seems to be a trade-off.
In the next stage of our research, the way to fix IV needs some improvement, for it heavily depends on the timing. If we can find a better way to get the same IV and IK twice,
